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RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
The potential impact of expanding target age
groups for polio immunization campaigns
Radboud J Duintjer Tebbens1*, Dominika A Kalkowska1,2, Steven GF Wassilak3, Mark A Pallansch4,
Stephen L Cochi3 and Kimberly M Thompson1,5
Abstract
Background: Global efforts to eradicate wild polioviruses (WPVs) continue to face challenges due to uninterrupted
endemic WPV transmission in three countries and importation-related outbreaks into previously polio-free countries.
We explore the potential role of including older children and adults in supplemental immunization activities (SIAs)
to more rapidly increase population immunity and prevent or stop transmission.
Methods: We use a differential equation-based dynamic poliovirus transmission model to analyze the epidemiological
impact and vaccine resource implications of expanding target age groups in SIAs. We explore the use of older age groups
in SIAs for three situations: alternative responses to the 2010 outbreak in Tajikistan, retrospective examination of elimination
in two high-risk states in northern India, and prospective and retrospective strategies to accelerate elimination in endemic
northwestern Nigeria. Our model recognizes the ability of individuals with waned mucosal immunity (i.e., immunity from a
historical live poliovirus infection) to become re-infected and contribute to transmission to a limited extent.
Results: SIAs involving expanded age groups reduce overall caseloads, decrease transmission, and generally lead to a
small reduction in the time to achieve WPV elimination. Analysis of preventive expanded age group SIAs in Tajikistan or
prior to type-specific surges in incidence in high-risk areas of India and Nigeria showed the greatest potential
benefits of expanded age groups. Analysis of expanded age group SIAs in outbreak situations or to accelerate
the interruption of endemic transmission showed relatively less benefit, largely due to the circulation of WPV reaching
individuals sooner or more effectively than the SIAs. The India and Nigeria results depend strongly on how well SIAs
involving expanded age groups reach relatively isolated subpopulations that sustain clusters of susceptible children,
which we assume play a key role in persistent endemic WPV transmission in these areas.
Conclusions: This study suggests the need to carefully consider the epidemiological situation in the context of
decisions to use expanded age group SIAs. Subpopulations of susceptible individuals may independently sustain
transmission, which will reduce the overall benefits associated with using expanded age group SIAs to increase
population immunity to a sufficiently high level to stop transmission and reduce the incidence of paralytic cases.
Keywords: Polio, Eradication, Dynamic modeling, Disease outbreaks
Background
The global commitment to eradicate wild polioviruses
(WPVs) and end poliomyelitis led to the launch of the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988, which
successfully reduced global polio incidence by 99% [1]
and eradicated one of the three WPV serotypes (i.e., type
2 or WPV2) around 1999 [2]. By early 2014, all except
three countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan)
successfully interrupted indigenous transmission of WPV
type 1 (WPV1) and no country has reported a case of
WPV type 3 (WPV3) for over a year [3]. Despite these suc-
cesses, the GPEI still needs to stop transmission of WPV1
everywhere contemporaneously and transition away from
the use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to achieve the
ultimate goal of ending all cases of poliomyelitis [4]. Partly
due to importations into previously polio-free countries
that caused outbreaks, the global annual incidence of para-
lytic polio remained around 1,000-2,000 cases between
2000 through 2010. The World Health Assembly in 2012
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urged further intensification of the GPEI by declaring “the
completion of global poliovirus eradication a program-
matic emergency for global public health” ([5], p. 2). Dur-
ing 2012 the GPEI reported the fewest cases and smallest
number of countries reporting cases in its history [6].
Successful polio eradication requires achieving and main-
taining sustained high levels of population immunity until
wild poliovirus transmission stops everywhere contempor-
aneously [4]. Although many high- and middle-income
countries can maintain high population immunity by reach-
ing and sustaining high routine immunization coverage,
other countries must rely on the use of supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs) that provide OPV during a
short period of time regardless of immunization history to
periodically and significantly boost population immunity [6].
Historically, SIAs emerged as a strategy to interrupt polio-
virus transmission during the low season by “flooding the
environment with vaccine virus so that a susceptible child
has a lower probability of encountering wild virus and/or by
rapidly increasing population immunity so that fewer sus-
ceptible children remain” ([7], p. 1332). The GPEI continues
to rely heavily on SIAs to close immunity gaps resulting
from sub-optimal routine immunization by targeting all
children under 5 years of age [8]. Typically, polio SIAs focus
on immunizing children younger than 5 years of age, be-
cause infants become susceptible once they lose protection
from maternal antibodies and most people get exposed to
circulating viruses during early childhood. Based on experi-
ence dating back to early OPV trials by Albert Sabin [9] and
polio elimination from the Western Hemisphere [10-12],
SIAs can dramatically reduce the prevalence of WPV and
rapidly interrupt transmission. However, following the intro-
duction of vaccination, the circulation of viruses may be-
come more episodic, and those missed by vaccination may
continue to remain susceptible and begin to accumulate.
With the passage of time since the interruption of WPV
transmission in most places, importation outbreaks in-
creasingly involve paralytic patients 5 or more years of age
[13-17], which provides clear evidence that immunity gaps
persist beyond early childhood in polio-free areas. Recog-
nizing the need to protect older children and adults in
these situations, the GPEI modified its outbreak response
recommendations to explicitly expand the age group tar-
geted in the first two SIAs up to 15 years of age or older
depending on the context even in the absence of observed
outbreak cases in older children and adults [8]. The failure
of frequent SIAs targeting only children under 5 years of
age to interrupt indigenous WPV transmission in the
remaining endemic areas also raises the possibility that
older children and adults may contribute significantly to
the overall transmission of polioviruses in those places,
even in the context of a substantial missed proportion of
targeted children during SIAs. This would mean that
expanding the target age groups for some SIAs in these
areas may provide a strategy to more rapidly interrupt
WPV transmission and maintain population immunity at
a level high enough to prevent transmission. Alternatively,
frequent SIAs targeting only young children may not pre-
vent persistent transmission because they fail to protect
enough children to completely stop transmission or they
repeatedly miss relatively isolated subpopulations that sus-
tain clusters of fully susceptible individuals. This would
mean that reaching previously missed subpopulations may
more rapidly interrupt transmission than expanding the
target age range in the entire population.
Achieving WPV eradication is the primary objective of
the GPEI. Further delay of the achievement of global
WPV eradication and subsequent OPV cessation carries
significant economic costs [18,19]. Donor fatigue and
competition for public health resources during difficult
economic times imply real financial risks for the GPEI.
This paper evaluates the potential role and benefits of ex-
panded age group vaccine campaigns using a differential-
equation based poliovirus transmission model [20]. We
explore different conditions and timing with respect to
the implementation of expanded age group campaigns by
considering several scenarios. We consider both prevent-
ive expanded age group SIAs occurring before outbreaks
in previously polio-free areas or expanded age group SIAs
prior to surges in incidence in endemic areas, and more
reactive expanded age groups SIAs in the context of out-
break response in previously polio-free areas or efforts to
accelerate the interruption of WPV transmission in en-
demic areas. Specifically, we model the potential impact
of including older age groups in SIAs for three specific sit-
uations: alternative responses to the 2010 outbreak in
Tajikistan, retrospective examination of elimination in
northern India, and retrospective and prospective strategies
to accelerate elimination in endemic northwestern Nigeria.
While numerous inputs of the poliovirus transmission
model remain highly uncertain [20-22], we assume for this
analysis that the process of model validation across a wide
range of situations produced representative generic model
inputs that apply to poliovirus transmission in any situation
(e.g., immunity states, waning process, OPV evolution
process) as well as realistic characterization of the condi-
tions in each of the three situations examined [20].
Methods
We use a previously developed model of poliovirus trans-
mission and consider three of the situations we used to fit
generic model inputs [20]. Briefly, the deterministic, differ-
ential equation-based model includes immunity states to
characterize the effect of recent (8 immunity states) or his-
toric (24 immunity states) live poliovirus (LPV) infections
and/or successful inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) vacci-
nations. For this analysis, the 18 IPV-related immunity
states remain inconsequential because we assume negligible
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IPV use in the three situations. Individuals in any active
immunity state remain completely protected from paraly-
sis if re-infected, but fully susceptible individuals and
infants with insufficient maternal immunity (those who no
longer possess protective levels of maternal antibodies)
become subject to a serotype-specific, age-independent
paralysis-to-infection ratio if infected [20]. The model
characterizes the evolution process from OPV viruses
towards WPV-like vaccine-derived polioviruses over 20
discrete stages, and explicitly considers serotype differ-
ences and both fecal-oral and oropharyngeal transmis-
sion [20].
The overall basic reproductive number (R0) character-
izes the average number of secondary infections generated
by combined fecal-oral and oropharyngeal transmission
from one infected previously fully susceptible individual
introduced in an entirely susceptible population. R0 for
any population depends on hygienic and sanitary condi-
tions, population density, mixing patterns, and climate,
and may exhibit short-term oscillations due to seasonality
as well as potential long-term trends. Given the different
conditions that exist around the world, R0 varies be-
tween populations. The model assumes space-homogeneous
mixing within each modeled (sub)population but includes
age-heterogeneous mixing by assuming that individuals
tend to mix preferentially with individuals of similar ages
[20]. For each situation, we separately determined the
proportion of contacts of any mixing age group (i.e., < 5,
5–14, or > 15 years of age) reserved for individuals of
the same mixing age group (κ) to produce age distri-
butions of cases consistent with the data. Specifically,
the model assumes κ of 30%, 35%, and 40% of contacts in
Tajikistan, northern India, and northwestern Nigeria, re-
spectively, implying moderate preferential mixing within
each mixing age group, with the remaining proportion
of contacts occurring proportionately with individuals
of all ages (i.e., including the mixing age group of the
contacted individual) [20]. Aging represents a multi-stage
process with transitions between any two age groups oc-
curring according to a first-order, exponential expiry
process [23,24], as specified in the model description [20].
Similarly, we characterize waning mucosal immunity,
which influences the ability to participate in fecal-oral and
oropharyngeal transmission, as a multi-stage process from
high immunity to poliovirus transmission immediately
after recovery from an LPV infection to reduced im-
munity to poliovirus transmission in the last waning
stage [20]. We assume previously infected individuals
reach the last waning stage after 4 years (Types 1 and 2)
or 3 years (Type 3) on average in the absence of
further infections [20]. Additional file 1 provides the
equations for the force-of-infection in the model with
age-mixing and multiple subpopulations as well as the
waning curves.
To characterize the stochastic event of die-out (elimin-
ation) of transmission of each LPV virus (i.e., WPV or
OPV-related virus in each reversion stage) in a popula-
tion in our deterministic model, we fixed a transmission
threshold of the effective infectious proportion (i.e., the
number of infectious people in a population, weighted
by their relative infectiousness to others, divided by the
total number of people in the same population) below
which the force-of-infection of a LPV becomes 0 in the
model [20]. We define the threshold as a proportion ra-
ther than an absolute number to avoid model artifacts
related to population size. Specifically, using a threshold
of 1 infection in a large population would eventually lead
to circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) fol-
lowing a SIA round in a WPV-free setting with low or no
routine immunization coverage, because it would take a
long time for the prevalence in the last reversion stage to
drop below 1, while cVDPVs would not emerge in a very
small population in which the prevalence would never ex-
ceed 1 in higher reversion stages. We apply the threshold
for each mixing age group and subpopulation separately,
which means that virus can continue to circulate in one of
these groups while giving a force-of-infection of 0 to other
groups. For mixing between sub-populations we assume
highly preferential mixing so that the time of elimination
can differ between subpopulations substantially (especially
if their immunity levels differ significantly). For mixing be-
tween age groups we assume relatively much less prefer-
ential mixing, so that elimination times between age
groups remain very similar. This approach provides a very
crude method to approximate die-out that occurs in ac-
tual populations and depends on local heterogeneity and
chance. However, the threshold we determined generally
produced elimination times consistent with the evidence
[20] and allows us to explore the relative differences in po-
tential elimination times between scenarios, even if the ac-
tual elimination times in the model do not reflect the
stochasticity of actual virus elimination.
We conducted extensive literature reviews with ex-
perts in the field [21,25] and elicited numerical values
from experts to estimate initial ranges of values for
model inputs related to poliovirus transmission and im-
munity [22]. We then calibrated the model within the
ranges obtained from the expert review process by visu-
ally fitting historical poliomyelitis incidence data and other
features of poliovirus transmission in 9 different situa-
tions, including the emergence of cVDPVs and WPV elim-
ination times, the age distribution of cases, and estimates
of zero-dose children derived from surveillance data (see
Additional file 1). We adopt the resulting generic and
situation-specific model inputs for this analysis [20] (spe-
cifically, Tables I, VII, XI, and XII for generic, Tajikistan,
northwestern Nigeria, and northern India inputs, respect-
ively in the prior publication). However, we modified the
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characterization of SIAs for prospective use of the model
to allow it to directly specify the true coverage of individ-
ual rounds and the probability of children repeatedly re-
ceiving or missing doses (see Additional file 1). Briefly, the
approach requires specifying the true coverage (TC) of
each SIA, defined as the fraction of the targeted popula-
tion receiving a dose, and the repeated missed probability
(PRM), defined as the conditional probability that a tar-
geted individual does not receive a dose in a round, given
that the individual did not receive a dose in the previous
round despite falling into the targeted population for that
round. From these, we calculate the repeated reached
probability (PRR), defined as the conditional probability
that a targeted individual receives a dose in a round, given
that the individual received a dose in the previous round.
In the model, we then track which of the fully susceptible
and maternally immune individuals (i.e., defined as chil-
dren born with maternal antibodies transferred to them
by an immune mother) at the time of an SIA are: (1) chil-
dren born since the last SIA, subject to a coverage of TC,
(2) children who did not receive a dose in the previous
round, subject to a coverage of 1-PRM, and (3) children
who received a dose in the previous SIA but remain fully
susceptible or maternally immune due to failure of the
vaccine to take, subject to a coverage of PRR. To ensure
that the overall coverage matches the specified TC in each
round, we evenly divide all remaining doses over all tar-
geted individuals with active immunity (i.e., individuals
not in the fully susceptible or maternally immune state).
Fractional rounds target less than the whole modeled
population target age range (e.g., only one district when
the modeled population represents a state) and reduce
each coverage by the same fraction targeted (F). For the
under-vaccinated subpopulations that we characterize in
northern India and northwestern Nigeria, we specify a rela-
tive coverage for this subpopulation compared to the gen-
eral population (see Additional file 1).
For all three situations, we compared the starting
point for the model to the best information available to
us as of August 2013. For all analyses, we keep all model
inputs constant except for those vaccination inputs that
specify the different policy scenarios (e.g. target age groups
of an SIA). For Tajikistan, we modeled a single population,
while for northern India and northwestern Nigeria we
modeled 90% of the population as the general population
and 10% as a relatively isolated subpopulation. Following
the publication of our earlier analysis [20], more complete
data became available for analysis on the cases that
occurred in the Tajikistan outbreak and the dose histories
of all acute-flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases since 1997 for
northern India and since 2003 for northwestern Nigeria.
We also updated the original demographic data [26] with
the 2012 revision from the United Nation’s Population
Division World Population Prospects [27]. These data
allowed us to better assess the age distribution of cases
and outbreak kinetics for Tajikistan and the historic
proportions of missed children for northern India and
northwestern Nigeria. Applying the new characterization of
SIAs to ensure consistency with the historic reported zero-
dose proportions among non-polio AFP (NPAFP) cases
over time, rather than estimates based on expert judgment,
led to some adjustments of generic and situation-specific
model inputs in order to produce more realistic historic
poliomyelitis incidence (see Additional file 1, Table 1).
Table 1 summarizes the inputs that we updated based
on improved information and better characterization of
SIAs, with all other input values in the model remaining
the same as reported earlier (see Additional file 1) [20]. In
the context of implementing the refined approach to SIA
characterization, we assume the same true coverage by
subpopulation for the expanded age group SIAs as for
children under 5 years of age (i.e., expanded age groups
SIAs imply the same coverage applied to a larger target
age range and the corresponding increase in vaccine doses
used). The assumption about the repeated missed prob-
abilities for older children and adults results in negligible
impact because a high proportion of individuals in the
expanded age groups benefit from actively acquired im-
munity, while we distinguish repeated missed and re-
peated reached probabilities only for fully susceptible and
maternally immune individuals.
We compute the number of doses administered for any
given SIA as the sum over each population of F ×TC ×
Ntarget, where the size of the target population Ntarget
comes directly from the model. The number of doses dis-
tributed differs from the doses administered, depending on
the wastage for the modeled situations. While we considered
data from the GPEI on doses planned nationally for each
SIA, we do not know how many doses the modeled states
actually administered, so we estimated these in the model.
Tajikistan
The column on the left of Table 2 lists the scenarios we
considered for Tajikistan. The model considers the 3 ad-
ministrative regions primarily affected by the 2010 out-
break (i.e., approximately two-thirds of the total Tajikistan
population) as one homogeneously mixing population
[20]. The model focuses on the large WPV1 importation
outbreak in 2010 that occurred in the context of sub-
optimal routine vaccination coverage since the last SIAs
in the early 2000s [14]. The reference case represents the
actual response to the 2010 outbreak that occurred, using
the reported target ages for each outbreak response SIA
(oSIA) round of 0–5 years for the first two rounds and
0–14 years for the 4 subsequent rounds [20]. For the al-
ternative scenarios, we considered the possibility that all
oSIA rounds targeted only 0–5 year olds, or that they all
targeted 0–14 year olds, and we also considered the size
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of the outbreak in the modeled (closed) population of the
3 affected regions if no response occurred. Given that the
outbreak probably reached its peak in this population
by the time the first large oSIA round occurred, we also
considered the impact of the same response scenarios, but
with each oSIA round conducted 30 days earlier. Finally,
we considered the impact of one or two hypothetical pre-
ventive SIAs (pSIAs) in 2009 targeting 0–5 or 0–14 year
Table 1 Model inputs that differ from those developed previously [20] after consideration of additional
situation-specific data and revised SIA characterization
Model input (symbol) Value in Duintjer
Tebbens et al. (2013) [20]
New value
Generic model inputs:
Ratio of R0 for PV3 vs. PV1 0.8 0.75
Average time to reach last reversion stag (ε, in days)
(for PV1; PV2; PV3)a
547.5; 360; 547.5 620.5; 408; 620.5
Basis for demographic data World Population Prospects:
The 2010 Revision [26]
World Population Prospects:
The 2012 Revision [27]
Tajikistan model inputs:
Relative routine immunization coverage compared to most recent
survey (used from 1992 forward)
0.9 0.88
Northern India model inputs:
Number of subpopulations (Bihar) 1 2
Size of subpopulation relative to total population
- Bihar NA 10%
- Western Uttar Pradesh 4% 10%
Proportional change in R0 due to seasonality (α) 0.25 0.20
Peak day of seasonal amplitude, WUP 195 (July 14) 165 (June 14)
Proportion of potentially infectious contacts of individuals in the
under-vaccinated subpopulation with other individuals in the
under-vaccinated subpopulation (pwithin)
- Bihar NA 0.70
- Western Uttar Pradesh 0.95 0.70
Routine immunization coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation Increasing over time 0
Per-dose take rate (tr) (PV1; PV2; PV3)
- tOPV 0.35; 0.50; 0.30 0.35; 0.60; 0.27
- mOPV 0.50; NA; 0.45 0.45; NA; 0.45
- bOPV 0.45; NA; 0.40 0.42; NA; 0.42
Northwestern Nigeria model inputs:
R0 8.0 7.5
Proportional change in R0 due to seasonality (α) 0.05 0.10
Day of seasonal peak in R0 (pd) 60 (March 1) 100 (April 10)
Basis for routine immunization coverageb POL coverage DTP coverage
Routine immunization coverage relative to reported data
- General population 1.08 1
- Under-vaccinated subpopulation 0.29 0
Per-dose take rate (tr) (PV1; PV2; PV3)
- tOPV 0.45; 0.7; 0.4 0.45; 0.7; 0.35
- mOPV 0.66; NA; 0.65 0.6; NA; 0.6
- bOPV 0.54; NA; 0.52 0.54; NA; 0.54
aThe original and new values equal 1.5 and 1.7 times the estimated time to reach viral protein 1 divergence thresholds defined by the Global Polio Laboratory
Network, [28,29], respectively.
bContinued discussion of available routine immunization data in Nigeria determined that DTP coverage probably provides a more reliable estimate of routine
immunization coverage for polio vaccine doses, because reported polio vaccine doses likely includes doses administered as part of SIAs.
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Table 2 Details of scenarios and estimates of the number of paralytic cases prevented, reduction of time until WPV elimination by serotype, and vaccine doses
administered compared to the reference case for Tajikistan with WPV1 imported on November 1, 2009 (top) and the hypothetical alternative reference case
with WPV1 imported on December 1, 2009 (bottom) (see Additional file 1 and Duintjer Tebbens et al. (2013) [20] for other model assumptions fixed across all
scenarios)
Expanded age group scenario Target age groups of
2010 oSIAs (in years),
by round
Dates (vaccines)
of 2010 oSIAs,
by round
Target age
groups of
2009 pSIA(s)
Dates (vaccines)
of 2009 pSIA(s)
(in years), by round
Paralytic cases
prevented,
2010 [%]
Reduction in WPV1
re-interruption
time (days)
Additional vaccine
doses administered
(millions)
Reference case: Actual target ages 0-5 (first 2) then
0–14 (last 4)
5/4 (mOPV1)
5/18 (mOPV1)
6/1 (mOPV1)
6/15 (mOPV1)
10/4 (tOPV)
11/8 (tOPV)
None Reference Reference Reference
No response None None −195 [−40%] −55 −7.7
All oSIAs target 0–5 year olds 0-5 (all rounds) 5/4 (mOPV1)
5/18 (mOPV1)
6/1 (mOPV1)
None −2 [0%] −6 −3.7
All oSIAs target 0–14 year olds 0-14 (all rounds) 6/15 (mOPV1)
10/4 (tOPV)
11/8 (tOPV)
None 19 [4%] 3 1.9
Actual target ages, start each round 30 days
earlier
0-5 (first 2) then
0–14 (last 4)
4/4 (mOPV1)
4/18 (mOPV1)
None 291 [61%] 23 0.0
All oSIAs target 0–5 year olds, start each
round 30 days earlier
0-5 (all rounds) 5/2 (mOPV1)
5/16 (mOPV1)
None 287 [60%] 10 −3.7
All oSIAs target 0–14 year olds, start each
round 30 days earlier
0-14 (all rounds) 9/4 (tOPV)
10/8 (tOPV)
None 312 [65%] 29 1.9
One pSIA in Spring 2009 targeting 0–5 year olds None 0-5 5/4 (tOPV) 481 [100%] 243 −7.1
Hypothetical alternative reference case: Actual
target ages, WPV1 introduction 30 days later,
start each oSIA 7 days later
0-5 (first 2) then
0–14 (last 4)
5/11 (mOPV1)
5/25 (mOPV1)
6/8 (mOPV1)
6/23 (mOPV1)
10/11 (tOPV)
11/15 (tOPV)
None Alternative
reference
Alternative
reference
Alternative
reference
One pSIA targets 0–5 year olds in Spring
2009, two oSIAs target 0–5 year olds
0-5 (both rounds) 6/7 (mOPV1)
6/21 (mOPV1)
0-5 5/4 (tOPV) 430 [89%] −9 −5.8
One pSIA targets 0–14 year olds in Spring
2009, two oSIAs target 0–5 year olds
0-5 (both rounds) 6/15 (mOPV1)
6/29 (mOPV1)
0-14 5/4 (tOPV) 450 [94%] −6 −5.3
Two pSIAs target 0–5 year olds in Spring
2009, two oSIAs target 0–5 year olds
0-5 (both rounds) 7/7 (mOPV1)
7/21 (mOPV1)
0-5 (both rounds) 5/4 (tOPV)
6/4 (tOPV)
471 [98%] 0 −5.0
Two pSIAs target 0–14 year olds in Spring
2009, two oSIAs target 0–5 year olds
0-5 (both rounds) 8/3 (mOPV1)
8/17 (mOPV1)
0-14 (both rounds) 5/4 (tOPV)
6/4 (tOPV)
476 [99%] 3 −3.7
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olds and attaining 80% true coverage per round, which the
country considered but did not conduct due to insufficient
funds [4]. Given that even a single pSIA targeting 0–5 year
olds prevents the outbreak altogether in the model with
all else equal, we constructed a hypothetical reference case
scenario as a comparator for the pSIAs. After observing
that the proposed 2009 pSIA would prevent the 2010
outbreak entirely in the model, we explored the impact of
a potential WPV1 introduction on a different dates to as-
sess the robustness of the results. We found that if we
introduce WPV1 one month later (i.e., 12/1/2009 instead
of 11/1/2009) the importation will lead to transmission
even with the 2009 pSIA, because of the higher seasonal
R0 at the time of introduction. For this hypothetical alter-
native scenario with importation on December 1, 2009,
the cumulative incidence reaches one paralytic case 7 days
later than for the reference case with November 1 WPV
introduction, and thus we also move all oSIA rounds by 7
days for the hypothetical alternative case comparator,
which we use to further explore the impact of different
pSIA scenarios. Similarly, for each of the four pSIA sce-
narios, we keep the time between the incidence reaching
one cumulative paralytic case and the oSIAs constant. We
assume that the generally much smaller outbreaks that
occur after the pSIAs trigger two oSIA rounds that target
0–5 year olds (Table 2).
Northern India
The column on the left of Table 3 lists the scenarios we
considered for northern India. The model separately
considers endemic WPV transmission in the entire state
of Bihar and 25 districts comprising the last reservoir of
indigenous poliovirus transmission in Western Uttar
Pradesh (WUP) [20]. Unlike the previous fit based on
more limited data about missed children that modeled
Bihar as one homogeneous population [20], we assume
both Bihar and WUP include relatively large preferen-
tially mixing subpopulations (i.e., 10% of the total popu-
lation in each area) with sub-optimal, but progressively
improving SIA coverage. The model focuses on reprodu-
cing the pattern of endemic circulation and elimination
of all three WPVs as well as an outbreak following a re-
introduction of WPV3 from WUP into Bihar in 2007
and the small type 2 cVDPV outbreak in WUP in
2009–2010 (see Additional file 1 for more details).
We explore several hypothetical retrospective scenar-
ios during the year 2008, when the Government of India
significantly intensified its immunization of children
under 5 years of age. The reference case represents the
calibrated model involving only SIAs targeting 0–4 year
olds. For the expanded age group scenarios, we remain
limited by the actual SIAs that occurred during 2008,
which includes fractional and full type 1 monovalent
OPV (mOPV1) and type 3 monovalent OPV (mOPV3)
rounds and two mixed mOPV1/tOPV SIAs in early
2008. Table 3 shows the expanded age group scenarios
we chose based on the available rounds. The first four
scenarios represent arguably realistic expanded age
group scenarios involving a single round expanded to
0–14 year olds, with different vaccines (tOPV, mOPV1,
or mOPV3) and two different timings for the mOPV1
round (i.e., during low or high season). All of the rounds
assume low true SIA coverage of between 0.05 and 0.25
for the under-vaccinated subpopulation for the reference
case, which we recognize limits the potential benefit of
the expanded age group scenario. Therefore, we also ex-
plored four scenarios involving an increase by 0.2 of the
SIA coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation
during the high season mOPV1 or mOPV3 round, with
or without expanding the target age range to all ages in
order to show the maximum possible benefit of ex-
panded SIAs (Table 3).
Northwestern Nigeria
The column on the left of Table 4 lists the scenarios we
considered for northwestern Nigeria. The model con-
siders the 7 states that comprise the Northwest zone of
the country, representing approximately a quarter of the
total Nigerian population [20]. As in Bihar and WUP, we
assume that approximately 10% of the Northwest zone
remains chronically under-vaccinated and preferentially
mixes with itself to sustain indigenous WPV transmis-
sion even when the general population became better-
immunized [20]. The model focuses on reproducing the
pattern of endemic circulation and elimination of all
three WPVs as well as the large and prolonged type 2
cVDPV outbreak that started around 2005 [30] (see
Additional file 1). The reference case represents continu-
ation of the status quo from 2013 forward, assuming
continued true coverage of 0.85, repeated missed prob-
ability of 0.85, and relative coverage of 0.2 in the sub-
population at the level reached in late-2013 in the
retrospective model. The planned SIA calendar for 2013
includes SIAs targeting all of the Northwest zone in each
month except August, with tOPV in March and September
and type 1 and 3 bivalent OPV (bOPV) in all other
months. For subsequent years, we assume that SIAs with
those vaccines continue to occur on the 15th of each
month except in August in the northwest. We focus on
the results for WPV1 because the model eliminated WPV3
by early-2013 and we do not explicitly include any re-
importation while type 2 cVDPVs continue at a very low
level, although we did not find that they disappear com-
pletely based on our assumed projected tOPV vaccination
intensity (see Additional file 1).
The expanded age group scenarios we consider include
two prospective scenarios that expand the November
2013 SIA with bOPV either up through 14 year olds or to
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Table 3 Details of scenarios and estimates of the number of paralytic cases prevented, reduction of time until WPV elimination by serotype, and vaccine doses
administered compared to the reference case for northern India (see Additional file 1 and Duintjer Tebbens et al. (2013) [20] for other model assumptions
fixed across all scenarios)
Expanded age group scenario Target age groups of
2008 SIAs (in years),
by round
Paralytic cases
prevented, 2008–2012
(WPV1&3) [%]
Reduction in WPV
elimination time (days)
Additional vaccine
doses administered
(millions)PV1 PV3 PV1 & 3
Bihara
Reference case: No expanded age groups 0-4 (all rounds) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Expand Jan 2008 (tOPV) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jan); 0–4 (all other rounds) 45 [11%] 35 1 1 16.0
Expand Jan 2008 (mOPV1) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jan); 0–4 (all other rounds) 26 [6%] 43 0 0 15.9
Expand Jun 2008 (mOPV3) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jun); 0–4 (all other rounds) 25 [6%] 0 5 5 15.7
Expand Jul 2008 (mOPV1) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jul); 0–4 (all other rounds) 19 [5%] 49 0 0 16.1
Coverage in under-vaccinated subpopulation
increased by 0.2 during Jun (mOPV3) SIA
0-4 (all rounds) 47 [12%] 0 9 9 0.2
Expand Jun (mOPV3) SIA to all ages with coverage
in under-vaccinated subpopulation increased by 0.2
All ages (Jun); 0–4 (all other rounds) 97 [24%] 0 152 152 71.7
Coverage in under-vaccinated subpopulation
increased by 0.2 during Jul (mOPV1) SIA
0-4 (all rounds) 16 [4%] 26 0 0 0.2
Expand Jul (mOPV1) SIA to all ages with coverage
in under-vaccinated subpopulation increased by 0.2
All ages (Jul); 0–4 (all other rounds) 43 [11%] 417 0 0 73.1
Western Uttar Pradeshb
Reference case: No expanded age groups 0-4 (all rounds) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Expand Jan 2008 (tOPV) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jan); 0–4 (all other rounds) 34 [6%] 28 2 2 10.5
Expand Jan 2008 (mOPV1) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jan); 0–4 (all other rounds) 24 [5%] 33 0 0 10.4
Expand Jun 2008 (mOPV3) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jun); 0–4 (all other rounds) 26 [5%] 0 −1 −1 10.3
Expand Jul 2008 (mOPV1) SIA through 14 year olds 0-14 (Jul); 0–4 (all other rounds) 28 [5%] 40 0 0 10.4
Coverage in under-vaccinated subpopulation
increased by 0.2 during Jun (mOPV3) SIA
0-4 (all rounds) 39 [7%] 0 −11 −11 0.1
Expand Jun (mOPV3) SIA to all ages with coverage
in under-vaccinated subpopulation increased by 0.2
All ages (Jun); 0–4 (all other rounds) 143 [27%] 0 −33 −33 47.6
Coverage in under-vaccinated subpopulation
increased by 0.2 during Jul (mOPV1) SIA
0-4 (all rounds) 23 [4%] 31 0 0 0.1
Expand Jul (mOPV1) SIA to all ages with coverage
in under-vaccinated subpopulation increased by 0.2
All ages (Jul); 0–4 (all other rounds) 55 [10%] 299 0 0 47.7
a1/6 (tOPV and mOPV1) 6/1 (mOPV3) 7/6 (mOPV1).
b1/6 (tOPV and mOPV1) 6/8 (mOPV3) 7/6 (mOPV1).
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Table 4 Details of scenarios and estimates of the incremental number of paralytic cases prevented, reduction of time until WPV elimination by serotype, and
vaccine doses needed compared to the reference for northwestern Nigeria (see Additional file 1 and Duintjer Tebbens et al. (2013) [20] for other model
assumptions fixed across all scenarios)
Expanded age group scenario Target age groups of SIAs
(in years), by rounda
Paralytic cases
prevented
(2012–2015) [%]
Reduction in WPV1
elimination time (days)
Additional vaccine
doses administered
(through 2014) (millions)
Reference case: No expanded age groups 0-4 (all rounds) Reference Reference Reference
Hypothetical retrospective scenarios:
Relative coverage in under-vaccinated during Feb (bOPV)
and Mar (tOPV) 2012 SIAs increased by 0.2
0-4 (all rounds) 93 [53%] 56 0.2
Expand Feb (bOPV) and Mar (tOPV) 2012 SIAs to all ages All ages (Feb and Mar 2012);
0–4 (all other rounds)
76 [44%] 49 46.3
11/10/2012 (bOPV)
Expand Feb (bOPV) and Mar (tOPV) 2012 SIAs to all ages
with relative coverage in under-vaccinated subpopulation
increased by 0.2
All ages (Feb and Mar 2012);
0–4 (all other rounds)
130 [75%] 302 46.5
Prospective scenarios:
Expand Nov 2013 bOPV SIAs through 14 year olds 0-14 (Nov 2013);
0–4 (all other rounds)
1 [0.6%] 17 9.3
Expand Nov 2013 bOPV SIAs to all ages All ages (Nov 2013);
0–4 (all other rounds)
2 [1.0%] 32 29.6
Relative SIA coverage in under-vaccinated subpopulation
increased by 0.05 from Nov 2013 on
0-4 (all rounds) 2 [1.2%] 58 0.4
Notes:
aSIAS in 2012 on 2/18 (bOPV), 3/31 (tOPV), 5/12 (bOPV), 7/7 (bOPV), 9/15 (bOPV), 10/4 (bOPV), 11/10 (bOPV), 12/1 (tOPV), and 12/15 (bOPV). SIAs in 2013 on 1/12 (bOPV and tOPV), 2/2 (bOPV), 3/2 (tOPV), 4/20 (bOPV),
5/11 (bOPV), 6/15 (bOPV), 7/6 (bOPV), 9/7 (tOPV), 10/12 (bOPV), 11/9 (bOPV), 12/14 (bOPV). For 2014 and 2015, we assume SIAs occur on the 15th of all months except August.
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all ages. For comparison, we explore a scenario of increas-
ing the relative SIA coverage in the under-vaccinated sub-
population compared to the general population by 0.05
from November 2013 through the end of 2014. The refer-
ence case in the model already represents an apparent
path to WPV1 elimination assuming a sustained commit-
ment to the current SIA schedule (with relatively few
cases expected in the model after November 2013). Low
coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation may limit
the benefit of expanded age group campaigns. Consequently,
we explore a number of hypothetical retrospective scenarios
during 2012 to consider the maximum potential benefit of
SIAs with higher coverage in the under-vaccinated sub-
population and at a time when a resurgence of WPV1
occurred. Specifically, we considered two scenarios that
assume 0.2 higher relative SIA coverage in the under-
vaccinated subpopulation compared to the general popu-
lation during the February and March 2012 rounds. In
one scenario, we assume these rounds target only 0–4 year
olds (as happened in reality), while in the other we ex-
panded the target age range to include all ages. We also
considered a scenario of expanding SIAs to all ages with-
out the improvement in the relative coverage in the
under-vaccinated subpopulation (Table 4).
Results
Tajikistan
Figure 1a shows the results of varying the target age
groups for the oSIAs conducted after detection of the
2010 WPV1 outbreak in Tajikistan. For this closed popu-
lation representing the three administrative regions af-
fected by the outbreak [20], the model fit for the reference
case appears broadly consistent with the data. The model
estimates a total of 481 cases in 2010, including oSIAs that
required an estimated 7.7 million doses (without consider-
ation of wastage), and re-interruption of WPV1 occurring
in August 2010. The outbreak appears to reach its peak in
this simulation due to natural burnout before the first
oSIA round, as demonstrated by the “No response” curve.
Consequently, the oSIAs only shift the incidence curves
slightly to the left after they occur, although they lead to a
significant reduction of 195 estimated cases (see Table 2)
a b
c
Figure 1 The impact of expanded age groups and other scenarios on incidence for the 2010 Tajikistan WPV1 outbreak. Arrows indicate
the time of elimination in the model for each scenario. (a) Actual dates of outbreak response (oSIAs). (b) Impact of earlier oSIA rounds and
preventive SIA rounds (pSIAs) in Spring 2009. (c) Hypothetical alternative outbreak assuming WPV1 introduction 30 days later.
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and an expected reduction of 55 days in the time to re-
interrupt transmission compared to no response. The out-
break response also probably prevented exportation and
more extensive spread to other populations than the 18
linked cases reported from three neighboring countries
[14], although it occurred too late to prevent these expor-
tations. Varying the target age groups similarly produces
relatively little impact on the overall transmission dynam-
ics, but we expect 2 additional cases if all four oSIAs tar-
geted 0–5 year olds and a total of 19 fewer cases if all
oSIAs targeted 0–14 year olds. The last column in Table 2
shows the additional doses implied by the scenario. Given
our assumption of a constant case-fatality rate by age for
poliomyelitis, which some evidence suggests may under-
estimate the number of fatalities and severity of paralysis
in older children and adults [31], we may slightly under-
estimate both the expected burden of disease and the clin-
ical benefit of targeting older age groups in oSIAs. We do
not anticipate a large difference in the total numbers of
cases, but we recognize the high visibility of any deaths.
Figure 1b shows that conducting the oSIAs 30 days
earlier prevents more than half of the cases in this popu-
lation (i.e., 287 or more of 481 cases, depending on the
target age groups), without costing any more doses. This
result reaffirms the analysis of outbreak responses that
“faster is better” [32]. However, the difference between vari-
ous choices of target age groups remains relatively small
even with an earlier response, with 25 additional cases pre-
vented if the first two oSIA rounds target all children under
15 years of age instead of only children under 6 years of
age. More importantly, in the context of managing popula-
tion immunity that focuses on prevention [4], Figure 1b
shows that with all else equal, a single pSIA round, as con-
sidered in 2009 [4], prevents the outbreak following the
WPV1 importation from India [14] into Tajikistan, because
it raises population immunity high enough over the thresh-
old to prevent substantial transmission.
We recognized the fragility of this finding to the as-
sumed but uncertain November 1, 2009 date of WPV1
importation, due to seasonal fluctuation in R0 and popu-
lation immunity remaining near the threshold even with
the pSIA. We used the model to explore the impact of
different WPV1 importation dates and found that by
moving the WPV1 introduction date to December 1
(i.e., 30 days later) we observe a small outbreak even
with a pSIA. We model this alternative importation using
the scenario identified at the bottom of Table 2 as the
hypothetical alternative reference case. Figure 1c shows
the results of the hypothetical alternative reference case
and four preventive SIA scenarios, with the oSIAs timed
to occur at the same time relative to when the cumulative
incidence exceeds 1 paralytic case (i.e., assuming the same
time between the actual oSIAs in Figure 1a and the
response-triggering signal of 1 cumulative paralytic case in
the model). The hypothetical alternative reference case
with response (Figure 1c) leads to an almost identical out-
break curve compared to the reference case with response
(Figure 1a) with slightly fewer total cases (case estimates
indicated in the legends following the scenario names).
We find that even with only two oSIAs in 2010, conduct-
ing preventive campaigns in 2009 reduces the size of the
outbreak that would have resulted from a later WPV1 im-
portation, which decreases the total number of doses (and
vaccine costs) significantly. All four pSIA scenarios
prevent the vast majority of cases and lead to significant
savings in numbers of doses administered compared to
the hypothetical reference case. The pSIA scenarios listed
in Table 2 do not significantly affect the time of die-out.
Overall, for pSIAs, we find a significant reduction of ap-
proximately 50% of the number of cases between targeting
0–5 and 0–14 year olds (Figure 1c). This finding remains
consistent with the existence of a sizeable number of
fully susceptible people in the age group 6–14 years old,
as reflected in the reported age distributions of cases [14].
It also shows that immunizing some of these susceptible
individuals as well as boosting individuals with waned
immunity in this age group provides sufficient added
population immunity to poliovirus transmission to sig-
nificantly influence the outbreak size and dynamics if any
importation occurs the following year. However, Figure 1c
also shows that adding a second pSIA targeted at 0–5 year
olds prevents more cases than expanding a single pSIA
through 14 years of age because of a combination of poor
tOPV take (i.e., 40% for type 1) and suboptimal coverage
of each pSIA (i.e., 80%).
Northern India
The model for the reference case for Bihar estimates 410
cases from 2008–2012, elimination of WPV1 in April
2010 and WPV3 in October 2010, and 70.2 million vac-
cine doses administered during 2008. The model for the
reference case for WUP estimates 532 cases during
2008–2012, elimination of WPV1 in April 2010 and
WPV3 in August 2010, and 50.5 million vaccine doses ad-
ministered during 2008. Figure 2 shows how the expanded
age group and other scenarios change the time series of in-
cidence of paralytic cases due to WPV1 and WPV3 in
northern India. While the two states and WPV serotypes in
Figure 2 involve dramatically different incidence patterns,
the qualitative impact of the expanded age groups remains
comparable. Conducting a single expanded age group
round targeting 0–14 years with no improvement in cover-
age for the under-vaccinated sub-population remains
roughly equivalent to an increase of 0.20 in the coverage
for the under-vaccinated sub-population without expanded
age groups. The difference between conducting a mOPV1
expanded age group SIA in the low or high season remains
relatively small. For both serotypes, the expanded age
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group SIAs with mOPV increase population immunity
more than SIAs with tOPV, although using tOPV may
eliminate both types earlier with a single expanded age
group SIA round. A substantial reduction in the elimin-
ation time occurs for WPV3 in the scenarios we explored
for Bihar (top of Table 3) but not for WUP (bottom of
Table 3) even in the case of SIAs expanded to all ages.
The lack of a reduction in the WPV elimination date re-
lates to the timing of the expanded age group SIA relative
to the natural transmission dynamics (Table 3 and
Figure 2). Most notably, for WPV3 in WUP, we see that
expanded age group SIAs in 2008 reduce the large peak in
WPV3 incidence in 2009. This translates to later elimin-
ation in the model because a higher WPV3 peak in 2009
following the outbreak helps with die-out in the model
due to the relatively larger increases in population im-
munity above the threshold needed to push the WPV3
prevalence to elimination. The maximum benefit (reduced
cases and elimination time) of an expanded age group SIA
in northern India occurs if coupled with an increase in
coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation and if it
includes all ages (Figure 2). Comparison to the scenario
with only increased coverage in the under-vaccinated sub-
population but without expanded age groups reveals a sig-
nificant effect of the expanded age group strategy.
Addition of a mOPV SIA targeted at all ages leads to
considerably more prevented cases and may shift the
modeled elimination time of the targeted serotype by over
a year (i.e., WPV1 in Bihar in the top of Table 3). This
comes at a cost of almost 120 million additional doses ad-
ministered in the two states, but it may potentially save
vaccine doses overall by allowing for earlier reduction in
the use of the monovalent vaccine.
Northwestern Nigeria
The reference case leads to an estimated 174 WPV1 cases
during 2012–2015, elimination of WPV type 1 in November
2014, and almost 190 million vaccine doses administered
during 2012–2014. Figure 3 shows how the expanded age
group SIAs and other scenarios reduce the incidence of
paralytic cases due to WPV1 in northwestern Nigeria. The
model suggests that with consistent true coverage and re-
peated missed probabilities for SIAs going forward in both
the general and under-vaccinated subpopulations, WPV1
a b
c d
Figure 2 The impact of expanded age groups and other scenarios on WPV1 incidence in northern India. Arrows indicate the time of
elimination in the model for each scenario. (a) Bihar – type 1, (b) Bihar – type 3, (c) Western Uttar Pradesh (WUP) – type 1, (d) WUP – type 3.
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elimination will occur in the second half of 2014 in the ab-
sence of any expanded age group SIAs. If the projected
rounds do not occur or do not sustain high coverage in
the general population while also consistently reaching
the under-vaccinated subpopulation, then we could see a
different path with a resurgence in cases.
Figure 3a considers the impact of hypothetical alterna-
tive strategies retroactively applied from 2012, which
show missed opportunities to prevent cases and reduce
elimination time. If northern Nigeria had conducted two
consecutive rounds in early 2012 and reached the under-
vaccinated subpopulation much better than we assumed
for the reference case (i.e., relative SIA coverage increased
by 0.20 from 0.25), then this prevents the entire resur-
gence of cases in 2012 even without expanded age groups.
This scenario reduces the WPV1 elimination time in the
model by almost 2 months (Table 4). The expanded age
group scenario in Figure 3a shows the expected benefit of
vaccinating all ages if these rounds attain the same im-
proved coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation,
with a shift in WPV1 elimination time of almost 1 year
(Table 4). This scenario involves almost 50 million add-
itional doses administered, which does not account for
any fewer doses needed after the achievement of elimin-
ation. Notably, real shortages in vaccine supplies limited
the willingness to consider expanded age group SIAs in
2012. The difference between these two scenarios suggest
that expanding the age groups of the SIAs may under cer-
tain circumstances provide the additional jump in popula-
tion immunity necessary to interrupt transmission, even if
the majority of fully susceptible people remain younger
than 5 years of age. Assuming that relatively large groups
of preferentially mixing under-vaccinated people in an
otherwise well-vaccinated general population of Nigeria
represent the main drivers of sustained WPV1 circulation,
then the expanded age group scenario in Figure 3a repre-
sents an upper bound for the potential benefits (prevented
cases and elimination time) of using expanded age groups
in northwestern Nigeria, with two rounds targeting all
ages coupled with successful efforts to reach previously
missed populations for those rounds. Expanding the target
age range of the two SIAs in 2012 without the improved
coverage for the under-vaccinated subpopulation leads
to less reduction in paralytic cases and elimination time
(Figure 3a and Table 4).
Looking prospectively, with very few cases predicted
by the model for the second half of 2013 and 2014,
Figure 3b focuses on incidence since 2013. Figure 3b
shows relatively little impact on WPV1 cases of an ex-
panded age group SIA in late 2013, regardless of whether
the round targets 0–14 year olds or all ages. Elimination
in the model occurs 17 days earlier if the expanded age
group SIA round targets 0–14 year olds and 49 days earl-
ier if the expanded age group SIA targets all ages, at the
costs of 9.3 or 29.6 million additional doses, respectively
(Table 4). Even a moderate, but sustained, improvement in
the relative SIA coverage for the under-vaccinated sub-
population by 0.05 (from 0.2) leads to a slightly greater re-
duction of elimination time than a single expanded age
group SIA round, with 58 days earlier WPV1 elimination
achieved in the model. This suggests that the impact of
the expanded age group SIA currently remains limited
given the existence of a preferentially mixing and under-
vaccinated subpopulation, particularly given our assump-
tion that the expanded age group SIA achieves coverage at
the same very low rate we assume for regular SIAs that
target 0–4 olds (i.e., a true coverage per round of only
0.2 × 0.85 = 0.17). We find similar results for variations of
a b
Figure 3 WPV1 incidence for expanded age group and other scenarios in northwestern Nigeria. Arrows indicate the time of elimination in
the model for each scenario. (a) Hypothetical retrospective policy changes starting in 2012, (b) Prospective policy changes starting late 2013
or later.
Duintjer Tebbens et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:45 Page 13 of 17
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/45
these scenarios with different timing of the expanded
age group SIAs, two consecutive rounds, or annually re-
peated rounds, in part also because the assumed status
quo trajectory does not lead to many expected future cases
(i.e., assuming 11 rounds per year with sustained high
quality in the general population).
Discussion
The results from this analysis suggest that expanded age
group SIAs may prevent polio cases and shift WPV
elimination forward in time, in some cases significantly
and in other cases moderately, depending on the cir-
cumstances. If conducted preventively before a possible
surge in cases (e.g., prior to an introduction into a polio-
free area, a time of poor vaccination intensity in an en-
demic area), then we expect the expanded age group
round to prevent a significant number of cases. This
supports the GPEI policy since 2012 of expanding the
age group targeted in the first two SIAs in response to
an outbreak in a polio-free country independent of the
initial age distribution of cases, as long as the outbreak
response remains large enough to include areas not yet af-
fected by the outbreak. The ability of reactive expanded
age group SIAs to stop transmission in endemic areas de-
pends on the target age range and how well the expanded
age group round reaches the key reservoirs of transmis-
sion. Consequently, the existence of a preferentially
mixing subpopulation consisting of clusters of un(der)-
vaccinated individuals in large enough numbers to sustain
transmission represents a key limiting factor for expanded
age group rounds if these rounds do not reach these pop-
ulations better than regular SIAs targeting children under
5 years of age. However, the model results show that as
new under-vaccinated communities get identified with im-
proved micro-planning, targeting age groups older than
only children under 5 years of age in these communities
may under some circumstances help accelerate the inter-
ruption of WPV transmission. Moreover, the widespread
social mobilization of a massive expanded age group round
may help to reach more children under 5 years of age as
well. Vaccinating expanded age groups immunizes some of
the remaining fully susceptible individuals in these age
groups, which although they represent only a small pro-
portion of all individuals in these age groups [33],
could add up to large numbers due to the size of the
population of individuals over 4 years of age.
Perhaps more importantly, vaccinating the expanded
age groups boosts already immune individuals so that
their ability to participate in transmission decreases. The
importance of this effect depends on the inherent effect of
waning on the ability to participate in poliovirus transmis-
sion. While some consensus suggests that even individuals
with historic poliovirus infection or vaccination and serum
antibodies that dropped below the detection limit still
remain protected from paralytic poliomyelitis disease due
to memory immunity, much uncertainty remains about
the role of memory immunity in limiting participation in
asymptomatic poliovirus transmission [21,22]. Several
studies suggest that individuals with historic immunity be-
come infected as readily after an OPV challenge as fully
susceptible individuals [34-38], but data on duration and
titers of excretion remain limited and no single study pro-
vides a direct comparison between known fully susceptible
individuals and individuals with historic, waned immunity
[21]. Moreover, the relationship between any reduction in
excreted virus titers and infectiousness to others remains
highly uncertain due to the practical challenges of measur-
ing these directly [22]. Nevertheless, the epidemiology of
polio strongly suggests that memory immunity reduces
participation in transmission to some extent, because
otherwise childhood vaccination would not sustain wild
polio-free status in so many countries in the world for
such a long time. Our assumptions about waning repre-
sent the result of an extensive model calibration process
within uncertainty bounds obtained from expert assess-
ments [22] based on careful consideration of the literature
[21] that produced dynamic poliovirus transmission be-
havior consistent with the evidence across a large number
of situations, including Tajikistan, northern India, and
northwestern Nigeria [20]. Specifically, we assume that in-
dividuals with 2 or more historic poliovirus infections
(from any live poliovirus infection) ultimately acquire a
relative fecal-oral transmission potential compared to fully
susceptible individuals of approximately 0.1 after starting
out with a relative fecal-oral transmission potential of near
0 immediately after recovery from the infection. The as-
sumptions differ by immunity state (e.g., for individuals
with only 1 prior poliovirus infection, we assume approxi-
mately double these values; see Additional file 1). The
expanded age group rounds move individuals from the
historic to the recent immunity state, which explains the
improvement in the overall population immunity even if
very few fully susceptible individuals remain in the older
age groups. We examined different assumptions about
waning but those would produce behavior inconsistent
with the evidence in some situations, unless we modified
other assumptions. For example, in northwestern Nigeria,
with more waning arguably under-vaccinated subpopula-
tions matter less and the general population may sustain
WPV transmission on its own, such that expanded age
group SIAs could yield more benefits (i.e., reduced cases
and shorter duration of transmission). However, such a
scenario produces many more cases during the early
2000s, which appears inconsistent with the evidence, and
would also imply that widespread WPV transmission con-
tinues throughout northwestern Nigeria even after 2010,
rather than transmission confined to clusters of preferen-
tially mixing under-vaccinated communities. Based on the
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extensive model calibration process, we believe that our
model provides a realistic characterization of waning.
While many existing poliovirus transmission models ig-
nore the potentially important dynamics of reinfection
and waning, one model that includes it also assumed in-
creasing potential to participate in transmission as a func-
tion of time since the last infection [39]. Compared to our
assumption of 0.1, Mayer et al. assumed that waning im-
munity eventually leads to a much higher relative trans-
mission potential compared to fully susceptible individuals
of between approximately 0.2 and 0.6, based on their inter-
pretation of the evidence without a direct comparison to
poliovirus incidence data [39].
Our prospective results for northwestern Nigeria offer
some hope that the area we modeled may achieve suffi-
cient population immunity to stop WPV1 elimination by
the end of 2014 given the assumed current path. How-
ever, this part of Nigeria represents only one part of the
country, which must achieve and maintain high levels of
vaccine coverage and population immunity everywhere.
The results shown here depend on the continuation of
the aggressive immunization strategy that we modeled,
and any change in strategy will change the results. Con-
tinued insecurity in the region, particularly in Kano
state, represents an ongoing concern, which might re-
duce the ability to sustain immunization intensity in the
area. Moreover, with only two tOPV SIAs per year the
model did not project elimination of type 2 cVDPVs des-
pite the assumed sustained improvement of SIAs going
forward. This implies the need to actively manage popu-
lation immunity for all three serotypes rather than fo-
cusing on a single serotype to reduce the immediate
risks of importation outbreaks and cVDPV ermergence
and the risks of type 2 cVDPV emergence following the
planned cessation of type 2-containing OPV use [4,8,40,41].
Although we do not anticipate that our overall inferences
related to the potential role of expanded age groups for
SIAs would change significantly if a resurgence occurs, we
emphasize that targeting expanded age groups may pro-
duce the largest reductions in expected cases and elimin-
ation times in areas with significant existing population
immunity gaps. Although we focused on the northwestern
part of Nigeria, the northeastern parts also warrant add-
itional attention.
Our analyses yielded some important insights not
directly related to SIAs targeting expanded age groups.
First, the retrospective analysis of the 2010 Tajikistan
outbreak makes a very strong case for a focus on preven-
tion (i.e., more pSIAs), which could save both substantial
health and financial costs. Given that an eradication ini-
tiative should focus on prevention of cases before they
occur [4], pSIAs must represent an important program-
matic priority. In the context of limited resources, con-
tinued assessment of population immunity in previously
polio-free countries and identification of clusters of sus-
ceptible people should motivate efforts to conduct pSIAs
[42]. Complementing serologic assessments and vaccin-
ation data collection, modeling may offer a tool to better
identify population immunity gaps before they occur [4]
and to determine the most important factors that contrib-
ute to low population immunity [43]. As long as WPV
continues to circulate globally it can transmit across long
distances [44], and the risk exists that the virus will find
such clusters [45], countries will need to invest in both ad-
dressing these population immunity gaps and interrupting
WPV globally as soon as possible. This suggests that if
known immunity gaps exist, conducting preventive SIAs
may offer a strategy that will save overall cases and doses
of vaccine. Second, continued efforts to reach previously-
missed or under-vaccinated populations remain essential
to interrupting transmission, regardless of whether they
focus only on children under 5 years of age or expanded
age groups. However, reaching these groups with sufficient
doses takes time and focusing only on these groups while
ignoring the general population carries the risk of perpetu-
ally chasing the virus, without attaining enough general
population immunity to prevent immunity gaps elsewhere.
Thus, continued intense efforts to vaccinate the general
populations everywhere remain critical while national pro-
grams in the remaining endemic countries continue to find
and reach any remaining underserved populations.
As with any model, our results reflect the limitations
of the model and the process used to generate model in-
puts. We rely on the approach of developing appropriate
reference cases and making comparisons to these, to re-
duce the potential impact of the assumptions that we
made to deal with inadequate data and multiple uncer-
tainties as we calibrated the model. Our characterization
of a subpopulation of un(der)-vaccinated individuals pro-
vides a tractable way to attempt to capture some of the
complex heterogeneity that exists, but we recognize that it
represents an abstract construction and that real popula-
tions are highly complex systems. Although we attempt to
capture all of the important complexities that exist, our
model represents a simplification of reality. With respect
to the interpretation of the model results for the time to
elimination, we caution that our simplistic approach to in-
corporate die-out in our deterministic model does not
capture the stochastic processes and true heterogeneity
that affect real elimination of polioviruses. Thus, the shifts
in elimination times between scenarios that we reported
indicate differences in the time when WPV prevalence in
the last remaining mixing group reach very low levels,
which may not fully capture all of the uncertainty and
variability that underlies the actual process of die out.
Other limitations related to the differential-equation based
model discussed in detail elsewhere also apply to this ana-
lysis of expanded age groups [20].
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Conclusions
This study suggests the need to carefully understand the
epidemiological situation, including the role of subpopu-
lations of susceptible individuals, and the potential for
waning immunity and re-infection of older children and
adults. Our results suggest relatively modest benefits of
expanded age group SIAs on estimated paralytic cases
and the time of interruption of WPV transmission, with
the greatest potential to increase population immunity
and accelerate WPV eradication for SIAs conducted pre-
ventively or reaching under-vaccinated sub-groups.
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